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Here I outline some of what science can tell us about the problems in psychological
publishing and how to best address those problems. First, the motivation behind
questionable research practices is examined (the desire to get ahead or, at least, not fall
behind). Next, behavior modification strategies are discussed, pointing out that reward
works better than punishment. Humans are utility seekers and the implementation of
current change initiatives is hindered by high initial buy-in costs and insufficient expected
utility. Open science tools interested in improving science should team up, to increase
utility while lowering the cost and risk associated with engagement. The best way to
realign individual and group motives will probably be to create one, centralized, easy to use,
platform, with a profile, a feed of targeted science stories based upon previous system
interaction, a sophisticated (public) discussion section, and impact metrics which use
the associated data. These measures encourage high quality review and other prosocial
activities while inhibiting self-serving behavior. Some advantages of centrally digitizing
communications are outlined, including ways the data could be used to improve the
peer review process. Most generally, it seems that decisions about change design and
implementation should be theory and data driven.
Keywords: open science, publication process, scientific communication, choice design
Previous research has outlined the problems with the current
publishing system and made suggestions about how to improve
the system (Gottfredson, 1978; Rosenthal, 1979; Ioannidis, 2005,
2012a,b; Benos et al., 2007; Björk, 2007; Birukou et al., 2011;
Simmons et al., 2011; Bekkers, 2012; Giner-Sorolla, 2012; John
et al., 2012; Kriegeskorte et al., 2012; Lee, 2012; Nosek and
Bar-Anan, 2012; Asendorpf et al., 2013). Instead of outlining
this work, here I examine how the scientific literature (espe-
cially Psychology) can help us understand the problems and
develop/implement more effective solutions.
WHAT IS THE REAL PROBLEM SCIENCE FACES?
The real problem for scientific communication and society more
generally is the desire for success and power (or the desire to avoid
failure) which prods human researchers to put their own interests
above the interests of the group (Hardin, 1968; Skinner, 1972;
Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Elliot, 2006; Thaler and Sunstein,
2008); the publishing system is only the obstacle this drive must
overcome. The dilemma is that in order to advance, or at least
keep, our careers, we must publish in high impact journals. There
is competition to publish in these journals and people naturally
began looking for a way to get the edge on the competition
(Bentham and Mill, 2004). As those who bent the rules had better
outcomes, the practices became normalized over generations,
resulting in widespread “questionable research practices” (QRPs;
Darwin, 1859; Skinner, 1972; John et al., 2012).
This motivation to get ahead is (probably) not a bad thing;
it is what drives Science and human progress in the first place.
The problem is an ineffective reward system which makes doing
the prosocial action (e.g., no QRPs, open data, no file drawer,
open methods) bad for the individual because it is less efficiently
achieves high impact work and thus promotion. The goal here is
to recast the system, the “game” the individual plays, such that
working toward the individual success is also working toward the
group’s success, or at least that individual success is not achieved
at the expense of the group (Skinner and Hayes, 1976; Thaler and
Sunstein, 2008).
DESIGNING SUCCESSFUL CHANGE
There are many ways to institute behavioral change, but his-
tory and the psychological literature suggest that motivating
change with reward is more effective than motivating change
with punishment, which basically creates better cheaters and even
encourages the behavior (e.g., prohibition, war on drugs, war on
terror; Skinner, 1972; Nadelmann, 1989; Sherman, 1993; Higgins,
1997; Bijvank et al., 2009; Branson, 2012). Instead of focusing
on creating tools to go back, catch, and thus punish (through
reputation costs) previous scientific wrongdoers (Francis, 2012;
Klein et al., 2014; Simonsohn et al., 2014), it would be better
to focus forward on creating a system, incentive structure, and
zeitgeist where the behavior is not continued (Gibbs et al., 2009);
this is the goal below.
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This is not a new goal, and many initiatives are attempting
to stimulate prosocial behavior using rewards (Hartgerink, 2014).
Unfortunately, without coordination, the effort to buy in quickly
outweighs the expected utility, limiting engagement (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Many competitors divide the manpower and
no tool has either all of the features that the scientist wants or
the widespread acceptance which ensures it will be useful in the
future. Initial step costs are also quite high, as for each new
system the researcher must invest hours to set up their profile,
learn the interface, and build up their network. These issues (e.g.,
high initial buy-in cost, divided utility/market, uncertainty of the
payoff) help to explain why psychologists, despite verbally endors-
ing change, are not meaningfully engaging with current change
initiatives (Buttliere and Wicherts, in preparation; Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Research has demonstrated that too many
options, especially for important choices like a retirement savings
account, paradoxically leads to less participation (Iyengar et al.,
2004).
In order to surmount these problems, open science tools
should work together, putting aside individual interests and com-
bining utilities in order to make the prize larger and lower the
cost of achieving that prize. The most successful technologies are
those that are so useful that people make time to learn and utilize
the tool on their own (e.g., the printing press, the telephone, the
internet, or Facebook, which is accessed more than 20 billion
minutes per day; Deci, 1971; Skinner, 1972; Legris et al., 2003;
Smith, 2014).
A PSYCHOLOGICALLY DESIGNED SYSTEM
The goal here is to make a tool so useful that researchers make
time to learn and utilize it on their own (like the microscope, the
Likert scale, or QRPs; Legris et al., 2003). The tool should also
endorse group centered behavior while inhibiting self-centered
behavior (Skinner, 1972). While there is much discussion about
the specifics of this ideal tool, it probably involves the inter-
net and emulates the most successful social media technologies
in utilizing: an attractive, easy to navigate, profile (e.g., osf.io,
Academia.edu, Frontiersin.org, Facebook.com), a feed of targeted
science stories based upon prior clicking behavior (e.g., RSS feeds,
Facebook.com, Twitter.com, Frontiersin.org; Lee, 2012; Nentwich
and König, 2014), a sophisticated rating/comment mechanism
for content (e.g., Reddit.com, PLoSONE.org, F1000.com, Pub-
Peer.com; Birukou et al., 2011; Hunter, 2012), and a new set
of impact metrics which make use of the information available
within the system (e.g., Klout.com, AltMetrics.org, Research-
gate.net; Walther and Van den Bosch, 2012).
The basic reinforcements for the system are probably also the
same as Facebook and Twitter, namely: the high quality, targeted,
content provided in the newsfeed (Bian et al., 2009) and the
good feelings we receive when notified that others have interacted
with our content (Berne, 1964). These immediate reinforcements,
paired with an easy to navigate user interface, are powerful
enough to make Facebook users log in an average of 14 times
per day and have researchers talking about Facebook addictions
(Andreassen et al., 2012; Cheung et al., 2013; Taylor, 2013).
When an individual posts a paper, dataset, general comment,
or new protocol to their profile, it shows up in the newsfeed of
those the system believes will find utility in that content (e.g., col-
laborators, colleagues, researchers who click similar stories) and
these people can view and publically comment on the work. When
an individual interacts with a post, the system notifies the original
poster (providing utility) and is more likely to display content
from the same source again. The feed can also contain low key
targeted notifications for professional organizations, conferences,
special issues, and other services which notify the researcher of
upcoming opportunities (again, utility) while also helping to pay
for the system, potentially paying for the system outright.
Centralizing and digitizing the discussion of a post is probably
the best part, as it provides the data upon which to generate
the feed and saves readers much time otherwise spent thinking
about things which have already been thought about (researcher’s
rewarded for providing links and information which is “liked”
by others). For instance, one could go to a paper or subfield
and see if anyone has mentioned Cognitive Dissonance The-
ory, join the conversation, or start their own discussion with
the authors/ community. While some may worry that reading
this information adds extra work, protestations of data overload
can be dealt with by first pointing out that we only need to
“read it if we need it”, but also that the system will include
sophisticated methods for discovering and readily presenting
the highest quality content (e.g., Reddit, Facebook Lookback;
Yarkoni, 2012).
When the researcher has a question they cannot find in the
discussion of a paper or (sub)field, the system could suggest a list
of experts who are likely to have the answer to that question (the
expert is rewarded for answering these questions). This system
could be keyword driven, pulling theoretical, methodological,
and analytical keywords out of the researcher’s papers to create
profiles (Pennebaker et al., 2001). These profiles can, in addition
to matching experts with questions and improving the feed, speed
along article/ researcher processing for meta(science) analyses and
create network maps, similar to social media maps for summariz-
ing literatures and fields more efficiently (Gilbert and Karahalios,
2009; Hansen et al., 2010).
GOOD FOR THE GROUP
Information contained in the system can also be used to reward
group based behaviors that are currently underperformed (e.g.,
making datasets/stimuli available, reanalyzing data, writing qual-
ity reviews). Impact metrics, instead of using only citations, can
utilize all of the data in the system including: the impact of
the individual’s work (e.g., shares, comments, ratings, who made
those ratings), the impact of their comments on other’s work,
whether data and syntax are uploaded, how well their interactions
predict the general community’s, how they answer questions they
are asked, and much more (Florian, 2012; Kriegeskorte, 2012).
The publicity of the comment section also means that the
individual can develop a reputation and accrue an audience,
driving impact. For instance, if one knows that certain researchers
check the methods and statistics of new papers, replicates them,
or just makes good comments, one may look for their comment
when reading/citing a new paper (though the system itself could
also have a built in statistics checker; Wicherts et al., 2012).
The original author wants those researchers’ helpful comments
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and thus uploads the materials, data, and syntax for them to
check (besides being rewarded directly for it). The methods
checkers and replicators are motivated to do a good job as it
is their reputation and the reader benefits enormously because
they can trust that the effects are replicable and as reported
(Yarkoni, 2012). Even if the reader doesn’t explicitly endorse
the comment (e.g., like, sub comment), by searching for the
author’s name in the comments or viewing the (statistical) repli-
cation page, reward can be administered. Because the individual
can become impactful by engaging in these prosocial activi-
ties, the need for QRPs is alleviated while also making them
harder to engage in, because people are rewarded for check-
ing.
The system outlined above could be implemented without
changing the fundamental peer review system. The proposed
changes are expected to improve the system by encourag-
ing, through quality impact metrics (Priem et al., 2010;
Kreiman and Maunsell, 2011; Yarkoni, 2012), open practices
and endorsing group centered behavior. Unfortunately, only
adding this to the current system still looks backwards and
does not deal with the competition to become published,
the time papers spend waiting for reviews (Peters and Ceci,
1982), or the excess cost of the current system (Rennie, 2003;
Edlin and Rubinfeld, 2004). It is time to examine how the
data within this system could help improve the peer review
mechanism.
MORE IMPACTFUL (READ: IMPORTANT) CHANGES
The changes suggested here are the most sensitive to small design
flaws, which, over the decades, will grow as the current issues
have. For this reason, it is imperative that we have a spirited
debate about the specifics outlined below and not believe that
our decisions are set in stone when we make them. Only con-
tinual maintenance of the system will ensure fidelity over time
(Blanchard and Fabrycky, 1990).
Others have already outlined several alternative mechanisms
by which to evaluate research including open review, review
conducted by specialized services, and various levels of pre
and post-publication review (Kravitz and Baker, 2011; Hunter,
2012; Kriegeskorte, 2012; Nosek and Bar-Anan, 2012). While
it is still unclear how to keep bias out of the review services
or reviews in general, we would like to suggest that the data
within the current system can be utilized to facilitate review
(Kreiman and Maunsell, 2011; Lee, 2012; Zimmermann et al.,
2012).
When a researcher wants to publish a paper, the system
could automatically send the paper to field experts, “rival” field
experts, non-experts, methods experts, and statistical experts,
based upon the data in the system (Kravitz and Baker, 2011).
Reviewers can be asked to write brief reviews and make quanti-
tative ratings of the paper or they can simply be presented with
the paper and the system can see how they react (as ignoring
the piece is also informative; Birukou et al., 2011; Kriegeskorte,
2012; Lee, 2012). These reviews can be done “pre-publication,”
where reviewers privately provide feedback (while being rewarded
through a counter on their profile), or the reviews could become
immediately public and serve as the basis of discussion after a
certain number of comments have been accrued (in order to
avoid the anchoring effect of a bad first comment; Bachmann,
2011). If the paper is received well, it can be suggested to
more individuals and groups that might also find utility in the
paper.
Professional organizations maintain their role as disseminators
of content (what they were originally designed to do; Benos
et al., 2007), but would no longer be responsible for evaluating,
reviewing, and publishing these works. Dissemination decisions
can be made by editors, or the professional organization could
use a computer and stipulate that in order for a paper to be
considered for dissemination, it has to have certain keywords
and have had × number of members comment on or like it,
including some with higher impact factors. Each organization
can have several “journals”, each with their own reputation (e.g.,
finding the most cutting edge work, only promoting the future
classics, only promoting those that are preregistered). When a
group promotes a work, the system sends it to those who are most
likely to find utility in it, similar to the individual but on a much
larger scale. The paper also earns a stamp of approval which grows
(e.g., Bronze, Silver, Gold badges; Nosek and Bar-Anan, 2012) if
the paper is received well and it is suggested to more users in the
group; in this way the paper can “go viral”.
One further addition I would like to add to proposals that
emphasize purely online review systems is the ability for, at the
end of the year (or decade), extra badges to be given for the
top 10 (or 100) papers published in a particular (sub)domain.
These collections could be put together for any aspect of the paper
(e.g., theory, methods, statistics), could be printed, and provide
something to aim for in the creation of content besides high
impact.
MOTIVATING CHANGE
Another aspect where Science can help is in getting people to
adopt the system. Though open and post-publication review are
popular among experts, a recent survey of 2,300 psychologists
conducted by this author found that changes related to opening
review were the three lowest rated potential changes to the publi-
cation system, with post publication review being rated 10th of 15
(Buttliere and Wicherts, in preparation). Change initiatives would
benefit from empirically demonstrating the utility of the proposed
changes, as has been done with opening review in the biomedical
field (Godlee et al., 1998; Walsh et al., 2000; Pulverer, 2010).
We also know that scarcity increases the value of a good
(Cialdini, 1993). When Facebook came out, it was only for
Harvard students and for several years was invite only. Similarly,
it may benefit a fledging open science platform to first be by
invitation only, perhaps limiting access to those who supported
the systems which combined to make it, and then only opening by
invitation from those already in the system (like Facebook was).
It should also be pointed out to field leaders and professors (who
will get invited to the system earlier than others) that they serve as
examples to others (especially students; Phillips, 1974) and that by
not pursuing change for the better, they signal that nothing needs
to be done and become a bad example (Darley and Latane, 1968).
Obviously, marketing and advertising should also guide naming
and implementation strategy.
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Concerns about Science using behavioral engineering (Huxley,
1935; Rand, 1937; Orwell, 1949), are necessarily brushed aside
by reminding ourselves that advertisers have been engineering us
for their own profit since before Skinner outlined the methods
in 1972. Behaviorally engineering a well-functioning system for
ourselves would go a long way toward showing the public what the
use of this technology for good looks like (Skinner, 1972; Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008) and would very likely garner more trust and
financial support in the future.
IN SUM
There are many problems with the current academic publishing
system, and many have suggested courses of action to solve
those problems. Here I highlight science that can inform the
discussion and decisions being made about these issues. Most
importantly, humans are utility seekers and use whatever tools
(e.g., QRPs) most efficiently help them achieve their goals. The
reason psychologists are not engaging with change initiatives is
because they have high initial step costs, and have uncertain out-
comes due to a fragmentation of the market. I propose that open
science tools put individual interests’ aside and work together
to raise the utility and lower the cost of using the common
tool. I next examined how the data from one, centralized, online
system can be used to improve scientific communication by being
immediately rewarding to the individual while also encourag-
ing group-centered behavior and concurrently inhibiting self-
centered behavior. There is much more conversation to be had,
but I hope this essay will help focus conversation on using science
to guide decision making.
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